Corrective Advertising: Panacea or Punishment by Johnston, Linda Osgood
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 17 Number 1 Article 16 
1978 
Corrective Advertising: Panacea or Punishment 
Linda Osgood Johnston 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Linda O. Johnston, Corrective Advertising: Panacea or Punishment, 17 Duq. L. Rev. 169 (1978). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol17/iss1/16 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Corrective Advertising: Panacea Or Punishment
Although corrective advertising has been previously imposed by
the Federal Trade Commission through consent orders,' the Com-
mission's power to require corrective advertising as a remedy for
allegedly deceptive advertising was first challenged in the courts
only recently in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC.2 In Warner-Lambert,
the D.C. Circuit held that although the Commission could not re-
quire an advertiser, in the absence of bad faith, to include state-
ments in future advertising which might serve to embarrass it,3
corrective advertising was a permissible tool to be used under the
authority of the Federal Trade Commission Act4 where the disclo-
sure's content would prevent future consumer deception.
This comment will explore the legality and use of corrective ad-
vertising as an FTC remedy for deceptive advertising. It is suggested
that the Commission has transcended the bounds of its statutory
power by ordering corrective advertising, and that imposition of
corrective disclosure requirements violates an advertiser's constitu-
tional rights.
1. Consent orders are a means by which an advertiser can limit or avoid costly litigation
by accepting the findings of the Federal Trade Commission and agreeing to the remedy the
Commission suggests. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra. See also Amstar Corp.,
[1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,356 (manufacturer of certain brands
of sugar consented to include in advertising for one year that its sugar was not a special source
of energy or strength); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 19,981 (advertiser consented to run one advertisement in every four for one year
with the disclosure that the "food energy" referred to in past advertising was supplied only
by the product's caloric content).
2. 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 1576 (1978) (where it was
shown that prior advertising of mouthwash was deceptive in that it stated erroneously that
product was effective for preventing colds and sore throats and alleviating their symptoms,
corrective advertising was a permissible remedy). Previously, corrective advertising had been
mandated through consent orders. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text infra.
3. 562 F.2d at 763. The court stated that the FTC had ordered the following disclosure:
"Contrary to prior advertising, Listerine will not help prevent colds or sore throats or lessen
their severity." Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the use of the disclosure minus the introductory
phrase "Contrary to prior advertising," holding that if its purpose was to attract attention to
the disclosure, it was made redundant by the other terms of the order. If its inclusion was to
humiliate the advertiser, it was uncalled for in the absence of proof of deliberate deception.
Id. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text infra.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). See notes 5-12 and accompanying text infra.
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I. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
The Federal Trade Commission, created by Congressional act in
1914,1 was first established to aid federal regulation of business,' but
was not given express power to regulate advertising at the time of
its creation. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act' de-
clared unfair methods of competition in commerce unlawful, and
the Supreme Court imposed a strict interpretation on this section:
the only type of advertising certain to be subject to Commission
sanctions was that which harmed free competition.8 The Court later
expanded its position when it held that competitive methods which
harmed consumers were themselves unfair.' This stance was legisla-
tively sanctioned in 1938 by the Wheeler-Lea amendment to the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which extended the Commission's
jurisdiction to include prohibition of acts in commerce deemed un-
fair or deceptive. 0 False advertising was described as a deceptive
practice." Jurisdiction was expanded again in 1975 to encompass
acts both in and affecting commerce.
Authority to impose a cease and desist order is the only power
5. Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
6. See Note, The Limits of FTC Power to Issue Consumer Protection Orders, 40 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 496, 506 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Limits of FTC Power].
7. Ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
8. See FIC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931) (no cease and desist order permitted
under Section 5 where no unfair competition proven).
9. FTC v. R.F. Keppel and Brother, Inc., 291 U.S. 304 (1934) (candy packaged so that
price paid or amount received by purchaser was found to be uncompetitive and disadvanta-
geous to the public, particularly since candy was inferior in size and quality).
10. Wheeler-Lea Act, Ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938). The Wheeler-Lea Amendment added a
phrase so that Section 5 of the FTC Act read: "(a) Unfair methods of competition in com-
merce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful."
(emphasis supplied) Id.
11. Wheeler-Lea Act, Ch. 49, § 4, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (1938). The new section read:
5(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate,
or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement-
(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the purpose of
inducing or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase of food,
drugs, devices, or cosmetics; or
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce,
directly or indirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices or cos-
metics.
(b) The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false advertisement
within the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be an unfair or deceptive
act or practice in commerce within the meaning of section 45 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (Supp. IV 1974) amending 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
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expressly granted to the Commission to remedy a Section 5 viola-
tion. 1 3 The Commission found this authority to be ineffectual, since
the time between the initial issuance of a complaint and the final
imposition of the cease and desist order could take years if the
advertiser decided to resist the order. This would allow the adver-
tiser to continue his advertising campaign, including the alleged
deception, until the litigation had ended, and then, once a cease and
desist order was issued, he would merely be forced to discontinue
the deception."
Realizing the deficiency in its express authority, the FTC sought
to find better methods for regulating deceptive advertising. One
method was to require affirmative disclosure in certain advertise-
ments run subsequent to issuance of cease and desist orders. 5 This
was at first resisted by the courts, which again strictly interpreted
the Commission's power as other courts had when the FTC Act was
first enacted." In Alberty v. FTC,'7 for example, the D.C. Circuit
held that the powers granted to the Commission by the FTC Act
permitted it to act to prevent false representations by forbidding
further publication of deceptive advertising," but that the FTC
exceeded its authority when it attempted to impose affirmative dis-
13. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). Once the FTC determines that a person or business is using
an unfair or deceptive advertising or sales practice, it may seek an order "requiring such
person, partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method of competition
or such act or practice." Id.
14. See Cornfeld, A New Approach to an Old Remedy: Corrective Advertising and the
Federal Trade Commission, 61 IowA L. Rzv. 693, 697-98 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Corn-
feld]; Comment, The Federal Trade Commission and the Corrective Advertising Order, 6
U.S.F.L. REv. 367, 379 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Corrective Advertising Order].
15. Where an advertisement appears deceptive because of a failure to state a material fact
rather than because of the inclusion of falsehoods, the Federal Trade Commission has re-
quired the advertiser to include the omitted facts in future advertisements. This affirmative
disclosure differs from corrective advertising in that an advertisement containing a corrective
disclosure is not itself deceptive to the consumer if the correction is deleted, whereas the
affirmative disclosure is necessary to prevent the advertisement from being misleading per
se. See Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 276 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960) cert. denied, 364 U.S.
827 (1960) (affirmative disclosure ordered where advertisements for products to cure baldness
failed to state that they had no effect on male pattern baldness which accounts for 90-95% of
all baldness). A similar order was issued in Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275
F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Cornfeld, supra note 14, at 706.
16. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
17. Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 818 (1950) (where drug
advertised as an aid for relief of tiredness was only helpful for tiredness brought on by iron
deficiency anemia, FTC was only permitted to issue cease and desist order against deception
but not to order disclosure of omitted fact).
18. This would be accomplished by issuing a cease and desist order. See note 31 infra.
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closure in future advertising,'" at least in those instances where it
had not proven that failure to state a product's limitations would
in itself be misleading.s
In subsequent decisions, the courts granted broader scope to the
Commission's power, but, rather than overruling Alberty, found in
all cases in which they determined affirmative disclosure to be justi-
fied that without the disclosure the advertisements would be mis-
leading.2' Alberty has even been interpreted as having given judicial
approval to enforcement of affirmative disclosure, by expressing the
standard that disclosure may be imposed where an advertisement
would be misleading without the inclusion of additional informa-
tion.2
Thus, in order to halt current and prevent future deception, the
Commission has adopted powers beyond the express authority
granted to it by the Federal Trade Commission to issue cease and
desist orders granted to it by the Federal Trade Commission Act.23
The Commission faced the future problem, however, of what could
be done in those instances where an advertiser had deceptively pro-
moted its product for a long period of time, and where there ap-
peared to be evidence that an advertisement's false representations
19. 182 F.2d at 39. An administrative agency has only those powers conferred upon it
legislatively. Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974) (coast guard com-
mandant had no power to suspend pilot's federal license). See also Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961) (CAB attempted to change certificate issued to
airline but could not when directly opposed to Congressional mandate); Peters v. Hobby, 349
U.S. 331 (1955) (Civil Service Commission's act held abuse of discretion by unwarranted
assumption of power).
20. 182 F.2d at 39.
21. Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
439, 490 (1964). See, e.g., J.B. Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967) (affirmative
disclosure upheld where product Geritol was only effective in reducing tiredness if person
suffered from iron deficiency anemia); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960) (affirmative
disclosure upheld where product to stop bedwetting was not effective where cause was organic
defect or disease).
22. Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18, 23 (5th Cir. 1960) (affirma-
tive disclosure ordered where advertisements for products to cure baldness failed to state that
they had no effect on male pattern baldness, which accounts for approximately 95% of all
baldness).
23. As long as a remedy could be considered reasonably related to the problem, it would
be upheld by a court. See FTC, v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 394-95 (1965) (adver-
tisements stopped where advertiser's use of plexiglass with sand coating to represent sand-
paper in television ad found deceptive); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946)
(name of material used in coat found deceptive because appeared to mean valuable fiber used
which was not; name change required). See also Corrective Advertising Order, supra note 14,
at 378-79.
1978-79 Comments
were remembered by the consumer long after the deception had
ceased. 4 Affirmative disclosure would only be effective where adver-
tising was to continue in the future. The question remained: what,
if anything, could be done to remedy past deception?
II. INTRODUCTION OF CORRECTIVE ADVERTISING
The idea of corrective advertising was first presented to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission by Students Opposing Unfair Practices, Inc.
(SOUP), a group of law students concerned about consumer protec-
tion, who filed a petition to intervene in the Commission's action
against the Campbell Soup Company." The Commission did not
permit SOUP to intervene nor did it require corrective advertising
by Campbell Soup." It did, however, assert in dicta its authority to
impose corrective advertising in the future where the situation mer-
ited a stronger remedy than traditional cease and desist or affirma-
tive disclosure orders."
Soon after, the Commission attempted to use the new remedy by
issuing a number of complaints against manufacturers whose adver-
tising campaigns had contained alleged deceptions.28 Its first correc-
tive advertising order was obtained by consent order in 1971 from
24. One goal of advertising is to create a favorable, lasting impression regarding a product
in a consumer's mind so that he or she will react favorably and purchase the product even
after the advertising has stopped. See Cornfeld, supra note 14, at 717. There is some dispute,
however, as to how effectively this goal is achieved. See, e.g., 1 ROSDEN, THE LAw OF
ADvERTISING § 9.03(4) at 9-29-31 [hereinafter cited as RosDrEN]. Cf. Corrective Advertising
Order, supra note 14, at 379.
25. Campbell Soup Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REO. REP. (CCH) 19,006. A
complaint had been issued against Campbell Soup for allegedly advertising soup in a decep-
tive manner by placing marbles at the bottom of a bowl to make the soup appear richer.
11967-70 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 18,706.
26. The Commission held that the consent order, already provisionally accepted, was an
adequate remedy. Campbell Soup Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,261.
27. Id. at 21,421. In a gratuitous comment, the FTC asserted: "We have no doubt as to
the Commission's power to require such affirmative disclosures when such disclosures are
reasonably related to the deception found and are required in order to dissipate the effects of
that deception." Id. No authority for this statement was given.
28. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,352 (advertisements for gasoline indicating pollution was reduced were allegedly false);
Coca Cola Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 119,351 (claims regarding
fruit content of Hi-C drink were allegedly false); American Home Prods. Corp., [1970-73
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,673 (advertisements purporting to prove
cleaning products' superiority over other brands were allegedly deceptive).
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ITT Continental Baking Company29 and required that at least 25%
of the company's advertising for Profile Bread during the next year
contain corrective advertising disclosures.3
Other consent orders followed.' In some, the respondents agreed
to run corrective advertising for a specified period of time;32 in oth-
ers, a percentage of their advertising for a certain time span was to
include corrective disclosures.3 Several advertisers consented to a
brief corrective campaign of intensive media placement4.3  In other
29. ITT Continental Baking Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,681. The consent order required that the corrective advertising consist of FTC-approved
advertisements explaining that the bread only had fewer calories per slice because it was
sliced thinner than others and that bread in general is not a superior food to aid in weight
reduction. Id. II71 Continental Baking was also the target of another proposed consent order
containing corrective advertising for its Wonder Bread and Hostess Snack Cakes, but the
complaint was dismissed as to the snack cakes since they did have a higher level of enrich-
ment than other similar products, as advertised. [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 20,495. Although the advertisements for Wonder Bread were found to be deceptive,
the corrective advertising order called for disclosure of broader deception than had been
found, so no corrective disclosure was ordered. Id. at 20,386.
30. [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,681.
31. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970) and 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) I 9,603-9,701 concerning
the procedure followed by the FTC. When the Commission has reason to believe a product
has been advertised deceptively, it first issues and serves a complaint. The complaint usually
calls for a cease and desist order to force the advertiser to halt any alleged deception and to
refrain from such deception in the future, and the Commission has wide discretion as to the
order's nature and terms. The respondent has the opportunity to be heard before an adminis-
trative law judge (AIJ) who is the fact-finder for the Commission proceedings. The ALJ's
findings become the decision of the FTC unless a petition for review is filed. The respondent
or the Commission may appeal, in which case the Commission reviews the A.J's decision.
This decision is then subject to review upon appeal by a United States Court of Appeals, and
then by the Supreme Court. Should a respondent prefer not to undergo full litigation proceed-
ings, he may agree by consent order to a cease and desist order whose contents are usually
proposed by the Commission, to which the Commission must give its final approval.
32. See, e.g., Amstar Corp., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,356
(manufacturer of certain brands of sugar consented to include in advertisements for one year
that its sugar was not a special source of energy or strength).
33. See, e.g., Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 19,981 (one in every four advertisements for one year was required to state that the
"food energy" referred to in past advertising was supplied only by the product's caloric
content).
34. See, e.g., Sugar Information, Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
20,142 and Sugar Ass'n., Inc., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,085
(one-time full page advertisements in six nationally-circulated magazines ordered to correct
previous advertisements indicating that use of sugar in the diet helps curb appetite and can
aid in weight reduction); Lens Craft Research and Dev. Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 20,509 (advertiser to run in same media as challenged advertise-
ments had run, including newspaper at least once a week for four weeks and radio for one
week, that its contact lenses should not be worn while sleeping or continuously for more than
a period of time prescribed by a doctor).'
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instances, the orders consented to by the respondents required in-
clusion in the corrective advertising a declaration of the advertiser's
admission of prior deception, a practice termed by commentators a
"scarlet letter" disclosure.3 During that time, the only orders issued
by the Commission which were not consent orders were conven-
tional cease and desist orders without corrective advertising require-
ments, even though the original complaints in some instances called
for corrective disclosures.36 In those instances, upon review, it was
found that the residual effects of the allegedly false or misleading
advertising were questionable.3 7 It was not until Warner-Lambert
that the Commission attempted to impose corrective advertising
without a consent order.3
III. THE Warner-Lambert DECISION
In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint
against Warner-Lambert Company, a pharmaceuticals manufac-
35. Where an advertiser is required either to say that its corrective advertisig is being run
pursuant to an order by the FTC or that previous ads were deceptive or misleading, the
disclosure has been labeled a "scarlet letter" disclosure in reference to The Scarlet Letter by
Nathaniel Hawthorne, a fictional work in which an adultress was required to wear a large
red letter "A" as a reminder of past indiscretions. The validity of the confessional effect of
the "scarlet letter" disclosure as an exercise of FTC power has been questioned and its use
criticized. See Putz, Advertising and the Law: An Overview of Recent Trends, II ADvTwrnsNG
LAw ANTHOLOGY xxi, xxxvii (1974); ROSDFN, supra note 24, at 9-32 and 9-43; Limits of FTC
Power, supra note 6, at 519-21. See also Boise Tire Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,347 (consent order to retract claim that tires sold were rated as number
one; correction to include statement "This advertisement is published pursuant to order of
the Federal Trade Commission"); Wasem's, Inc., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE RG.
REP. (CCH) 20,536 (local drug store to run ads that its vitamins previously were erroneously
advertised, and that neither the Food and Drug Administration nor the FTC had recom-
mended or approved them).
36. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
19,352; Sun Oil Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,856; Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., [1967-70 Transfer Binder] TRADE RG. REP. (CCH) 19,011.
37. Standard Oil of Cal. [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,789
(advertisements that gasoline had eliminated pollution from emissions found deceptive but
no corrective advertising ordered because evidence concerning residual effect inconclusive);
Sun Oil Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,704, $ 20,658 (advertis-
ing that gasoline maximized car's performance found deceptive but because belief disap-
peared from consumers' minds fast, no corrective advertising ordered); Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (safety claims concerning tires were deceptive but
insufficient residual effect of advertising was shown to order corrective advertising).
38. Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
1575, 1576 (1978) (corrective advertising imposed by order of FTC on manufacturer of mouth-
wash whose advertising had claimed it relieved colds and sore throats).
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turer, alleging misrepresentation in the company's advertising of
Listerine Mouthwash. 9 At the fact-finding hearing, 0 the adminis-
trative law judge (ALJ) found that the advertisements were decep-
tive and ordered that all advertisements for the mouthwash for the
next two years contain the disclosure, "Contrary to prior advertising
of Listerine, Listerine will not prevent or cure colds or sore throats,
and Listerine will not be beneficial in the treatment of cold symp-
toms or sore throats."
4
'
Upon review,42 the Commission upheld the cease and desist order
containing the requirement for corrective disclosure,43 but modified
the time requirement. Instead of the original two-year period, in
which the advertiser could forbear from advertising at all during the
prescribed time span, the Commission called for the corrective ad-
vertising to be run until Warner-Lambert had expended an amount
on the advertising of Listerine that equaled its average annual Lis-
terine advertising budget for the ten year period from April 1962, to
March 1972."
On appeal,4 5 the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit affirmed the decision of the Federal Trade Commission but
modified the disclosure requirements by deleting the words
"contrary to prior advertising"4 since such a disclosure would have
39. Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co., [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 19,838. The FTC alleged that Warner-Lambert's advertising of the mouthwash was
false since it fraudulently induced consumers to purchase the product to prevent and relieve
colds and sore throats. Id.
40. See note 31 supra.
41. Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20, 777
at 20,636. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, without explanation, quoted a slightly differ-
ent version of the order. See and cf. note 3 supra.
42. An advertiser's first recourse upon an adverse finding by an administrative law judge
is an appeal to the Commission. See note 31 supra.
43. Warner-Lambert Co., [1973-76 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,066.
The Commission discussed in detail its support of the ALJ's factual determination that
Listerine was not beneficial for relief of colds or sore throats, id. at 20,927-32, and asserted
its authority to order corrective advertising. Id. at 20,934-35.
44. Id. at 20,937. The advertiser thus could complete the requirement in a year or less or
could stretch it out indefinitely, but if the advertiser chose to continue advertising the prod-
uct, the disclosure could not be avoided. This appears to be less arbitrary and more related
to the problem than previous time or frequency requirements. See notes 31-34 and accompa-
nying text supra. See also Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation
of Advertising, 90 HARv. L. REv. 661, 700 (1977); Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of
the Federal Trade Commission, 85 HAlv. L. REv. 477, 503 (1971).
45. See discussion of FTC procedure at note 31 supra.
46. 562 F.2d 749, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 1576 (1978).
Vol. 17: 169
Comments
the effect of either calling attention to the correction or humiliating
the advertiser. Sufficient attention would be attracted without the
phrase, the court reasoned, and humiliation of the advertiser might
be necessary only in cases of deliberate deception."
The court also discussed whether Congress had granted sufficient
power to the Commission to order corrective advertising and con-
cluded that it had.48 Although previous courts had interpreted Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act narrowly, the court observed that the modern
approach was to apply a liberal interpretation."9 The court held
erroneous the advertiser's reliance on the legislative history0 and
the express powers granted to the courts by the 1975 amendments
to the Act5' to support its argument that the Commission had no
power to impose corrective advertising. Further, the first amend-
ment did not prevent the issuance of a corrective advertising order
since false speech was afforded no protection. 2 Finally, the court
concluded that the fact that there were no judicial precedents spe-
cifically upholding corrective advertising was not determinative of
the Commission's power to impose disclosure, and precedent per-
mitting affirmative disclosure supported the Commission's posi-
tion.13
Judge Robb, dissenting in part, agreed that there was sufficient
evidence for the Commission to have found previous advertising
deceptive, but disagreed with the imposition of corrective advertis-
ing.5 He reasoned that the Commission did not have the authority
to punish advertisers, but could only issue cease and desist orders
47. Id. at 763. Although the "scarlet letter" was deleted here, the court left the door open
for future imposition by holding: "The second purpose (humiliation), if it were intended,
might be called for in an egregious case of deliberate deception, but this is not one." Id. See
also note 35 supra and notes 92-96 and accompanying text infra.
48. 562 F.2d at 756-61.
49. Id. at 756. See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966) (Commission permit-
ted to use remedies beyond those expressly granted by statute).
50. 562 F.2d at 757. Although Congress chose not to permit criminal penalties, treble
damages or civil penalties for deceptive advertising, the question of corrective advertising was
never addressed. Id.
51. Id. The fact that the 1975 amendments to the Act expressly authorized a court to
impose public notification among other remedies did not establish that the Commission did
not also have power to do so. Id.
52. Id. at 758. The Supreme Court in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), had recently upheld freedom of commercial speech but first
amendment protection was not extended to false speech. Id. See also notes 96-98 and accom-
panying text infra.
53. 562 F.2d at 759-61.
54. Id. at 764 (Robb, J., dissenting in part).
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to prevent future illegal practices.55 Discussing the position of the
1975 amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act granting
relief to redress injury to consumers or others,5" Judge Robb con-
cluded that public notification encompassed corrective advertising,
and that such sanctions could be imposed by a court only after an
advertiser had been found in violation of an FTC final cease and
desist order.57 Thus, bad faith would be required before any relief
resembling punishment could be imposed, and then a court, but not
the Commission, would have the authority to order it.5 The judge
noted that the Commission's authority to issue cease and desist
orders would not alone grant it the power to impose corrective ad-
vertising. 9
Judge Robb disagreed with the majority's comparison of correc-
tive advertising with affirmative disclosure in cases where a product
55. Id. Support for this position was found in FTC, v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470 (1952)
(roofing material manufacturer enjoined from selling products at lower prices than competi-
tion). The Ruberoid court held: "Orders of the FTC are not intended to impose criminal
punishment or exact compensatory damages for past acts, but to prevent illegal practices in
the future." 343 U.S. at 473.
56. The amendment reads, in pertinent part:
(2) If any person, partnership, or corporation engages in any unfair or deceptive act
or practice (within the meaning of section 45(a) of this title) with respect to which the
Commission has issued a final cease and desist order which is applicable to such
person, partnership, or corporation, then the Commission may commence a civil action
against such person, partnership or corporation in a United States district court or in
any court of competent jurisdiction of a State. If the Commission satisfies the court
that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one which a
reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudu-
lent, the court may grant relief under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) The court in an action under subsection (a) of this subsection shall have jurisdic-
tion to grant such relief as the court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers or
other persons, partnerships, and corporations resulting from the rule violation or the
unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be. Such relief may include, but
shall not be limited to, recission or reformation of contracts, the refund of money or
return of property, the payment of damages, and public notification respecting the rule
violation or the unfair or deceptive act or practice, as the case may be; except that
nothing in this subsection is intended to authorize the imposition of any exemplary or
punitive damages.
15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) and 57b(b) (Supp. V 1975).
57. The amendment specifically states that the Commission may commence a civil action
if any person, partnership or corporation engages in any unfair or deceptive act or practice
with respect to which the Commission has issued a final cease and desist order. See note 56
supra. Judge Robb's conclusion would therefore seem to be cogent, since a reasonable inter-
pretation would be that no court action is possible absent bad faith. See notes 120-125 and
accompanying text infra.
58. 562 F.2d at 765 (Robb, J., dissenting in part). See also note 57 supra.
59. 562 F.2d at 765.
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had been altered without public notification."0 He pointed out that
in Warner-Lambert the corrective advertising related to past and
not future acts and was therefore beyond the scope of permissible
Commission remedies,' even where it was asserted that the disclo-
sure would be required to prevent future illegal practices.2 Although
Warner-Lambert attempted two more avenues of appeal, 3 the hold-
ing of the D.C. Circuit remained unchanged.
Is CORRECTIVE DISCLOSURE A VIABLE REMEDY FOR DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING?
Corrective advertising is based on the proposition that advertising
creates a residual effect in consumers' minds. 4 In fact, such a resi-
dual impact is one purpose of advertising, although its effectiveness
has been the subject of some dispute. 5 If an advertisement is not
remembered, the use of corrective advertising is unwarranted; if
there is no residual effect, corrective disclosure becomes a tool to
punish advertisers for false or misleading advertisements instead of
a prospective remedy to prevent future deception, and, therefore, is
beyond the scope of FTC power. 6
60. Id. at 767. The judge argued that a corrective advertising statement would not be
prospective in nature but would relate solely to past advertising. Id.
61. Id. at 768. Since the advertiser would have to include the disclosure in all future
advertising until the required budget had been expended, including advertisements in which
Listerine was advertised as an effective mouthwash and breath freshener, the requirement
was retrospective and not prospective since it would serve as a reminder of past discarded
advertising. Id.
62. Id. See also Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974) (Commission attempt to
require refund to consumers from advertiser found engaged in deceptive practices held be-
yond FTC's power).
63. Rehearing was denied in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
and the Supreme Court refused certiorari at 98 S. Ct. 1575, 1576 (1978). See note 31 supra,
outlining the FTC procedure.
64. See ROSDEN, supra note 24, at 9-4.3; Cornfeld, supra note 14, at 707.
65. See note 24 supra.
66. See note 81 and accompanying text infra. Various attempts have been made to prove
advertising's residual effects and to measure their purported impact on consumer purchases,
but none have been found conclusive. See Corrective Advertising and the FTC: No, Virginia,
Wonder Bread Doesn't Help Build Strong Bodies Twelve Ways, 70 MICH. L. REv. 374, 379
(1971). Advertisers themselves study the effects, and sometimes claim excellent results, so it
has been suggested that the courts might allow the FTC a presumption of recall. Id. However,
such studies may be the result of zealous advertising agencies attempting to prove the efficacy
of their campaigns, and the fact that advertisers continuously attempt to measure advertising
results does not indicate conclusively that all ads are remembered, nor that every ad has an
effect on consumer response. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text infra.
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Even if the existence of consumer recall of a past advertising
claim can be proven, the effect of retention on attitude and motiva-
tion is uncertain. Advertisers have attempted to measure the effects
of their advertisements in relation to consumer response in a variety
of ways. Scientific methods of motivational research have evolved,"
and many forms of testing have been formulated in order to attempt
to measure the effectiveness of advertising in attracting consumer
attention and in motivating consumer purchases.18 Among the test-
ing schemes are those which measure recall of advertising," and
those measuring attitude toward a product, 0 but it has not been
determined conclusively that there is a correlation between these
factors and purchases." Thus, even if an advertiser did promote his
product through false or misleading advertising, and tests prove
that consumers remember the deceptive portions, the advertiser
might not have realized any gain from the deception. It would follow
that corrective advertising theoretically would have no economic
effect on the marketplace if substitution of the truth in a consumer's
mind for an advertised falsehood did not alter his purchasing habits.
Corrective advertising would thus be prospective in nature since its
only result would be to correct a false impression and it would
therefore be a remedy within the FTC's powers."
It appears, however, that there is a correlation between consumer
purchase response and the product image created by advertising.7 3
Image differs from an actual advertising claim in that whereas a
claim is purportedly a fact about a product, the product's image is
67. See V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 5 (Pocket Book Edition 1957) [hereinafter
cited as PACKARD]; S. ULANOFF, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSUASIVE
COMMUNICATION 48 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ULANOFF].
68. See, e.g., D. NYLEN, ADVERTISING: PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION AND CONTROL 517 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as NYLEN].
69. Id. at 526. Some methods of measuring recall include personal interviews regarding
what advertisements a reader remembers having seen in an issue of a magazine he has read,
telephone interviews to detemine viewer recall of a test advertisement on television. Id. at
526-27.
70. Id. at 530. In attitude tests, an attempt is made to measure consumer opinions of a
product, but an opinion or change of attitude is not only formed because of advertising. Id.
at 536.
71. Leavitt, Waddell and Wells, Improving Day After Recall Techniques, 10 J. ADVERTIS-
ING RESEARCH 13 (June 1970). Recall testing of advertising may be irrelevant since people may
remember ads for products they do not buy, and may be motivated to buy for other reasons.
Id.
72. See note 81 infra.
73. PACKARD, supra note 67, at 38.
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the mystique created by advertising and other promotional and de-
sign methods designed to motivate brand loyalty.74 If a product's
image changes negatively, the product is likely to be purchased less
frequently.75 Thus, if corrective advertising causes negative attitude
changes, the remedy is by its nature punitive since its effect is to
penalize deceptive advertisers by taking away customers.76
Studies have been conducted to determine the actual effect of
corrective advertising on consumer attitudes." Researchers found
that corrective disclosures altered consumers' attitudes, making
them feel less favorably toward the product brand advertised.7" The
more explicit the disclosure, the less favorable the attitude be-
came.79 These studies support the argument that imposition of
corrective advertising has a punitive effect, since the resultant con-
sumer attitude change could economically harm the advertiser,A
The Federal Trade Commission has no power to punish a way-
ward advertiser, but must move prospectively, preventing future
deception.8 Various arguments have been offered to support the
74. See id. at 39.
75. Images created by advertising and other factors appear to create brand loyalty. If the
image is altered, purchase responses also change. Id. at 41. A negative image change thus
could lead to fewer consumer purchases.
76. The FTC has no power to punish deceptive advertisers. See note 79 and accompanying
text infra. Cf. Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974) (Commission attempt to require
refund to consumers from advertiser found engaged in deceptive practice was held beyond
FTC's power).
77. Hunt, Effects of Corrective Advertising, 13 J. ADVERISINo RESEARCH 15 (Oct. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hunt]. The study was based on corrective advertising in the Standard
Oil case. [1970-73 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,352.
78. Hunt, supra note 77, at 19.
The whole corrective ad concept is based on the premise that the corrective ad will
result in less favorable levels of attitude, thereby removing the favorable brand atti-
tude gained by deceptive advertising and depriving the deceiver of his ill-gotten com-
petitive advantage. The data indicates that corrective ads do generally result in less
favorable levels of attitude.
Id.
79. Id. at 21. Likewise, general disclosures create less consumer disfavor than specific
ones. Id.
80. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra. The FTC might also vary the degree
of punishment by imposing disclosure requirements of greater or lesser specificity. See note
79 supra.
81. See FTC v. Ruberoid, 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1951) (roofing material manufacturer was
enjoined from selling products at lower prices than competition); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333
U.S. 683, 706 (1948) (cease and desist order of FTC alleging unfair trade practices upheld);
Niresk Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337, 343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960)
(FTC findings that advertising was deceptive sustained); Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d 578,
579 (2d Cir. 1941) (findings of FTC that respondent had misused the term "wool" in advertis-
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theory that corrective advertising is prospective rather than re-
trospective, and most of these center around the purported residual
effect.8 1 Others call for corrective advertising to strip the advertiser
of his increased market share gained by his previous deception,M
but, again, this is effectively punitive in nature .8 So far, these are
the sole theories advanced for granting the FTC the right to order
corrective advertising. However, since under both theories the Com-
mission exceeds its authority by punishing the advertiser, 5 there is
no legal justification for ordering corrective advertising.
Even assuming, arguendo, that corrective advertising is a remedy
within the FTC's scope, problems regarding its content and the
procedure for its imposition remain. FTC procedure is comparable
to that of other administrative agencies. The FTC initiates the pro-
cedure as complaintant, presenting its case before the administra-
tive law judge, who is employed by the Commission. The judge
makes the original fact-finding determination as to whether the
advertisement in question is false or misleading.6 The Commission
also acts as the lower appellate court since it hears the first review,
if any, and thus, the FTC independently controls the initial stages
of the procedure.8 7
Various doctrines have emerged in the construction of adminis-
trative authority and power. Agencies are regulated procedurally by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 8 which prescribes, among other
things, record keeping methods,89 public hearing requirements, 0
and procedures for judicial review.' Where a party attempts to
avoid administrative procedure and go first to the courts to be
heard, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, in which the courts must
ing upheld). See also Judge Robb's dissenting opinion in Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562
F.2d 749, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1575, 1576 (1978); Corrective Advertising
Order, supra note 14, at 379; Corrective Advertising-The New Response to Consumer
Deception, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 415, 424 (1972).
82. See Cornfeld, supra note 14, at 694; Thain, Corrective Advertising: Theory and Cases,
19 N.Y.L.F. 1, 22 (1973); Limits of FTC Power, supra note 6, at 516.
83. See Corrective Advertising Order, supra note 14, at 381.
84. ROSDEN, supra note 24, at 9-28.
85. See notes 76-80 and accompanying text supra.
86. See note 31 supra.
87. Id.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
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abstain where preliminary resort to an agency is called for, con-
trols." A corollary is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, under which a party is not entitled to judicial relief until
all possible administrative remedies have been used.13 Thus, re-
course to the courts often takes years and is potentially quite expen-
sive since other avenues must be exhausted first."
To avoid the additional costs of litigation, some advertisers have
submitted to "scarlet letter" disclosures by consent order. 5 It is
possible that if challenge had been offered, an order requiring that
the advertiser admit prior wrongdoing or state that the correction
was required by the Federal Trade Commission would not be up-
held, since it was deleted from the order in Warner-Lambert as
being too punitive, at least in this particular factual situation."
Perhaps the court's finding on this point will be sufficient to prevent
the Commission from again attempting to impose such orders, but
it appears that confessional disclosure was not abolished provided
deliberate deception is established." "Scarlet letter" disclosures
are, however, punitive by their very nature, since they call attention
92. The doctrine was defined in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
353 (1963). See, e.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) (Federal
Maritime Board had exclusive jurisdiction of alleged violation of Sherman Antitrust Act by
a voluntary association of far eastern traders); Great North. Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator
Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922) (no preliminary resort to Interstate Commerce Commission necessary
where no question of fact existed).
93. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969). See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem
Steel, 303 U.S. 41 (1938) (National Labor Relations Board procedure must be exhausted
before review by appellate court permitted).
94. Where appeal has been made to the judiciary, courts have eliminated corrective
advertising requirements when the Federal Trade Commission was unable to present convinc-
ing evidence regarding consumer recall of allegedly deceptive advertising. See, e.g., National
Comm'n. on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,751 (7th Cir. 1977). Some
advertisers may have accepted corrective advertising under consent orders where there was
no convincing evidence of any residual effect, the primary justification for corrective advertis-
ing, to avoid additional litigation.
95. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
96. 562 F.2d at 752.
97. See note 47 and accompanying text supra. Since the court did not forbid the use of
"scarlet letter" phrases in cases where deliberate deception has been found, this decision may
have an effect similar to Alberty, in which the court held that the FTC had no power to order
affirmative disclosure, at least where there were no findings that without disclosure future
advertisements would be misleading. Courts following Alberty found questioned advertise-
ments deceptive where no affirmative disclosures were included. See notes 17-22 and accom-
panying text supra. The FTC may thus find deliberate deception in a majority of cases in
the future and impose corrective advertising with the confessional disclosure. This would,
however, be punitive and beyond the scope of Commission power. See notes 79 supra and 95
infra and accompanying text.
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to alleged misdeeds of the advertiser. 8 This remedy might more
justifiably have been forbidden altogether, since the Federal Trade
Commission may now potentially impose confessional disclosures
on advertisers simply by finding deliberate deception, which would
inflict punishment on advertisers beyond the scope of FTC power
and in opposition to advertisers' first amendment free speech
rights."
Additionally, the use of corrective advertising by the Commission
potentially encroaches in the first amendment area of prior restraint
on speech. The doctrine of prior restraint has been used almost
exclusively in the area of censorship of obscenity, 0 ° but courts have
held that although there are some areas in which it might be permit-
ted, 1 1 there is a strong presumption against any advance restraint
of expression. 10 2
Corrective advertising is within the realm of prior restraint of
expression since an advertiser is forbidden prior to issuance of an
advertisement from circulating it without including in it a correc-
tive disclosure. It is, in effect, a form of censorship which, even prior
to publication, is not per se illegal, provided that procedural safe-
guards are followed. 10 3 For example, the court in Freedman v.
Maryland, 10, a landmark decision in the area of prior restraint held
98. See ROSDEN, supra note 24, at 9-32 and 9-44.
99. The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Protected speech includes commercial speech. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech protected by the
first amendment). First amendment rights also protect against prior restraint of speech. See
notes 100-108 and accompanying text infra.
100. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LmIRRv oF CONGREsS, THE CoNsTrrrnoN OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 943 (1973).
101. See, e.g., Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957) (state statute having some
prior restraint features upheld on other grounds).
102. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (law permitting a state commission
to notify book publishers that certain material was objectionable and requesting that publish-
ers cooperate in preventing distribution to minors found unconstitutional as prior restraint
where lists of books sent to local police departments). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 716 (1931) (injunction forbidding newspaper from printing article tying local officials to
organized crime on penalty of contempt held impermissible on grounds of prior restraint).
103. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (Maryland's motion picture censor-
ship statute overturned on constitutional grounds because procedural safeguards not followed
regarding prior restraint). See also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1958) (California
property tax exemption requiring statement that person did not advocate violent overthrow
of government discarded because considered prior restraint).
104. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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that administrative censorship prior to adjudication may be permit-
ted provided that the censor proves the speech concerned is not
protected by the first amendment, that a judicial determination is
sought, and that the hearing is held promptly.0 5
By analogy, since corrective advertising is a form of censorship,
the Federal Trade Commission should have the burden of establish-
ing that the form of expression in question is not protected, i.e., that
the advertising is false speech and therefore beyond first amend-
ment protection.' 6 It may then issue a cease and desist order con-
taining the corrective disclosure requirement should corrective ad-
vertising continue to be upheld as a valid FTC remedy despite other
grounds to discard it,"°7 but a judicial hearing would be necessary
before the order could be considered final, and the hearing would
necessarily be held promptly. Only in this manner could prior re-
straint via corrective advertising be imposed without infringing
upon the advertiser's constitutional rights. 08
Nor does the FTC have authority to punish an advertiser after
105. Id. at 58. The court held:
Applying the settled rule of our cases, we hold that a noncriminal process which
requires the prior submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional infirmity only
if it takes place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system. First, the burden of proving that the film is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor . . . Second . . . [tihe teaching of our cases is that, because
only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensi-
tivity to freedom of expression, only a procedure requiring judicial determination suf-
fices to impose a valid restraint. . . . Any restraint imposed in advance of a final
judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to preservation of the
status quo for the shortest period compatible with sound judicial resolution ...
Therefore, the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision, to minimize
the deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license.
Id. Freedman concerned a statute requiring issuance of a license prior to a theater being
permitted to show a film. A board of censors thus had to preview the film and give approval
by means of a license.
Procedural safeguards were extended to protection of other forms of speech in Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) (law permitting Postmaster General to stop delivery and return
allegedly obscene material to sender after a hearing was struck down as unconstitutional).
106. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 751 (1976) (commercial speech protected by first amendment but false speech is
not); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (media not protected under first
amendment for untrue defamatory remarks against private citizen).
107. See, e.g., notes 66-85 and 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
108. But see ROSDEN, supra note 24, at 9-16-17, where the commentator interpreted the
Warner-Lambert court's view of prior restraint regarding corrective advertising as a
"permissible regulation of an illegal economic activity, since it is aimed at eliminating its
continuing effects." Id.
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publication,' 9 even if the advertisement is a direct violation of a
final cease and desist order. Only the courts have the power to
punish advertisers who have been issued final cease and desist or-
ders and who deliberately disobey them."' The majority in Warner-
Lambert held that the express grant of this power to a court did not
establish that the Commission, too, did not have the authority to
grant relief it found necessary to redress injury to consumers, and
indicated that the Commission could utilize the same remedies
granted expressly to the courts, including public notification."'
Judge Robb's dissenting opinion postulated a more reasonable in-
terpretation of the statute, however." 2 The granting of the power to
the courts, he reasoned, would not have been necessary if the Com-
mission already had such authority."3 In addition, the fact that the
courts were required to find bad faith was another indication that
the Commission had no comparable power, particularly since it was
not required to find bad faith."' Thus, a better reasoned view com-
pels the conclusion that a final judicial determination is required
before punishment for allegedly deceptive speech is permitted, and
the authority to impose this punishment is not granted to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Trade Commission has been charged with the diffi-
cult task of protecting consumers from unfair trade practices.", Its
position is particularly onerous in that it must protect those who are
least able to protect themselves-the most naive or gullible con-
109. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 57b(a)(2) and (b) (Supp. IV 1974). See also notes 55-58 supra. A civil
penalty was recently imposed by the courts against STP Corporation for alleged violation of
a cease and desist order. The penalty consisted of a $500,000 civil penalty, the largest ever
for allegedly deceptive advertising, and $200,000 for widespread publication of a settlement
notice which was to include a statement that STP was in violation of an FTC order regarding
false or deceptive advertising. Many of the settlement advertisements were to be run at full-
page size. STP Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,390 (1978).
111. 562 F.2d at 757-58.
112. Id. at 765 (Robb, J., dissenting in part).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (trading stamp
company not permitted to suppress stamp exchanges); National Petroleum Refs. Ass'n. v.
FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1973) (rule-making power of
the Federal Trade Commission questioned).
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sumer."'I The Commission must not, however, achieve these goals
at the expense of the rights of others and by exceeding its express
and implied authority.
Corrective advertising has also been attempted by several other
federal agencies." 7 These agencies may have also exceeded their
power, or it may be that their legislatively granted authority in-
cludes corrective disclosure as a legitimate remedy for violation of
their regulations. The fact remains, however, that the Federal Trade
Commission has not been granted the right to use corrective adver-
tising to redress consumer harm, and it should no longer do so.
Portions of the advertising industry have begun the task of self-
regulation,"' and have met with some success."' Nevertheless, it
would be unrealistic to believe that this is sufficient to prevent all
false or deceptive advertising in the future. Perhaps another remedy
is needed to protect the consumer from the deceptive advertiser, but
the answer to the problem is not corrective advertising.
LINDA OSGOOD JOHNSTON
116. The law (the Federal Trade Commission Act) is not made for experts, but for
the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze, but are governed by
appearances and general impressions.
Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910) (cease and desist order
upheld against toothbrush manufacturer who packaged his product to look like and have
similar name to another brand). See Charles of the Ritz v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir.
1944) (cease and desist order upheld against cosmetics manufacturer who had represented
products as restoring youthful appearance to skin). See also Cornfeld, supra note 14, at 715.
117. The Civil Aeronautics Board, for example, looked into advertising of Trans World
Airlines and required correction of allegedly false representations. See ROSDEN, supra note 24
at 9-4.3 and 47 ADVEMrSING AGE 1, 88 (Jan. 29, 1976).
118. Some of the groups attempting self-regulation have developed their own standards
of publication. These include the National Advertising Review Board of the Council of Better
Business Bureaus; the Television Code and Radio Code of the National Association c Adver-
tising Agencies. See NmLEN, supra note 68, at 577; ULASor,, supra note 67, at 461.
119. The National Advertising Review Board of the Council of Better Business Bureaus
recently questioned some advertising of the Wella Company and the Tetley Tea Company
and both advertisers immediately changed their advertising campaigns. See 49 ADVERTIsING
AGE 28 (Jan. 16. 1978).

